2 Beyond Borders: Comparative Disaster Response Systems and the Challenges of Humanitarian Relief and Coordination

Author

Dulce Suarez, Ph.D., Florida International University

 

Keywords

emergency managers/disaster responders, humanitarian logistics, coordination, international response, FEMA

 

Abstract

Disasters are global issues that require scholars and practitioners to find realistic and reliable solutions. As the frequency and intensity of disasters increase, we must cross borders and nations to have effective methods to address shared global challenges. To provide a well-rounded analysis, a comparison approach on two separate systems in global disaster management provides a foundation for exploring the topics. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The systems of these two organizations have different approaches yet face the same challenges within their response mechanisms. The chapter aims to analyze two case studies, each addressed by a different agency, to find applicable solutions to the challenges created by these specific historical disasters. The analysis will highlight the need for effective, coordinated, and flexible solutions to manage the growing global demands on disaster response efforts.

Introduction

Every nation and region addresses disasters based on their capabilities, resources, politics, and circumstances. However, we discover that common challenges plague all response systems as disasters affect each nations and regions equally. Whether you reside on the shores of South Florida or the mountains of the Pacific Northwest, disasters have no nationality nor borderline restrictions. They affect all landscapes and all nationalities. Around the world, each disaster impacts diverse landscapes, from the coastal regions battered by hurricanes and tsunamis to mountainous areas prone to landslides and avalanches as well as arid deserts that may experience rare but devastating flash floods. The escalating severity of these events amplifies the strain on response systems and the protocols governing global disaster management. Due to the increased intensity of disasters, practical, coordinated, and adaptable solutions are needed now more than ever to address the increasing pressure on disaster response efforts worldwide.

To contribute to the solutions, this chapter focuses on the research topic of comparing the international reactionary cluster system created by the United Nations (UN) with the United States responsive structure of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The comparison aims to evaluate how each structure addresses common problems faced in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. This is important since every day we are reminded of the constant levels of disasters and that delving deeper into international, national, and local alliances is more crucial than ever. By examining different systems and processes that respond to disasters, we can improve the effectiveness of aid and assistance in disaster-affected regions worldwide. As David A McEntire and Sarah Mathis stated, “Comparison will also improve the practice of emergency management as it permits us to learn from the mistakes and success of others.” (McEntire and Mathis, 2007). Hence, comparative methods of emergency management systems worldwide provide us with an understanding of what other institutions worldwide are developing as practical solutions to disasters.

In my years of experience, I have classified disaster management as a field of chaos and structure operating within the same timeframe. Based on my exposure, many resources and and a great deal of research support a reactionary approach. Efforts address individual events rather than comprise a unified effort to save lives and reduce suffering through comparative analysis. Within the phases of disaster management, the response by any structure is reactionary. However, as scholars and practitioners, we must elevate our studies, if not for ourselves then for the communities we serve. The cycle of response is one topic that should be analyzed not as a lesson learned or an attempt to place blame; instead, the response phase should remind us of our need to enhance our preparedness and mitigation efforts. With this in mind, the following chapter will examine two systems: the structure within the United States territories and the international humanitarian system. We will focus on two problems plaguing all humanitarian responders and their immediate work: the lack of accurate information and failures in the logistics of humanitarian relief. Both are serious problems that affect all response systems and require complex solutions. The rationale of the chapter and its analysis is to provide appropriate information and resources for discussing possible solutions to the problems.

Literature Review: Comparison of Two Separate Systems

Our world is currently grappling with an unprecedented level of global humanitarian need. In light of this situation, there is a need to examine two different response systems. The first is FEMA, a structure based on a hierarchy that utilizes a chain of command system for the operation. The second structure is the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) response mechanism, which is unique because of its cluster approach. What is the purpose of this comparison? The answer is multifaceted. The first objective is to understand the problems generated by disasters, and the second is to understand how each approach may be the key to future dialogues and possible solutions.

United States: FEMA

To begin our exploration, we focus on the role of FEMA, established by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 2020). The Stafford Act provides clear direction for disaster response and recovery framework through presidential disaster declarations (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 2020). The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which then united FEMA and 21 other organizations under a single organization (Kahan, 2015). FEMA, as a component of HS, coordinates preparedness, protection, response, and recovery efforts within the United States. (Kahan, 2015). The agency has the authority to process the disaster declaration process and facilitate disaster operations. (Kahan, 2015). FEMA is crucial in coordinating disaster response and recovery efforts across the United States. Understanding FEMA’s field-level operational structure and alignment with the Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) is essential to appreciating its effectiveness in managing emergencies.

The principles and practices of ICS and NIMS heavily influence FEMA’s field structure and operations. At the heart of FEMA’s approach is ensuring a unified and efficient response to disasters. FEMA organizes local response efforts using the ICS framework, which allows for a scalable and flexible response structure that can expand or contract based on the needs of the incident. This alignment with ICS ensures that FEMA can integrate seamlessly with other governmental and non-governmental responding agencies. The official definition of the ICS was written by the United States Department of Homeland Security, which states that the ICS is a “widely applicable management system designed to enable effective, efficient incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communication operating within a common organizational structure” (Kahan, 2015). The ICS command structure provides an orderly chain of command consistent across responding organizations. One of the critical ways FEMA incorporates ICS into its operations is by establishing Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs). These teams are deployed to incident sites to provide on-the-ground coordination and support, mirroring the ICS structure with defined roles such as Incident Commander, Operations Section Chief, and Logistics Section Chief. This facilitates effective communication and coordination and ensures that all responders work within a familiar and standardized system.

FEMA’s advocacy of ICS and NIMS frameworks is fundamental to the nation’s ability to manage disasters effectively. First responders and state and local agencies all operate and are trained with the ICS and NIMS framework. They are trained in the forms and the processes of ICS and NIMS. When FEMA is active, the ICS and NIMS frameworks are the established guidelines that guide federal, state, and local agencies. In addition, FEMA’s use of the NIMS framework further enhances its ability to manage large-scale incidents. By adhering to NIMS guidelines, FEMA ensures that its response operations are consistent with national standards, promoting interoperability and cooperation among all stakeholders involved in disaster response. For example, during the response to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA utilized the integration of ICS and NIMS principles to coordinate with local, state, and federal partners. However, there were lessons learned to improve future responses. Hence, ICS and NIMS are used by those that fall within the FEMA structure. Therefore, ICS and NIMS help FEMA tackle the problems created by disasters, such as lack of resources, disorganization, lack of unity, and even communication problems among several agencies. Thus, supporters of the ICS model argue that it establishes a universally applicable management framework capable of meeting the demands generated by disasters. The ICS provides standardized and predictable procedures, bringing a bureaucratic structure to the chaotic organizational environment typical of disasters. This structure reduces duplication and redundancy and ensures a unified chain of command. In essence, the strengths of ICS lie in providing common terminology, modular organizations, management by objectives, flexibility, scalability, and universal applicability across various crises and the diverse organizations involved in the response. (Kahan, 2015).

Throughout history, FEMA and its standardized approaches have been subjected to periods of criticism (Kahan, 2015). The first criticism is that the bureaucratic structure fails to recognize critical factors in disaster response, particularly the presence of unorganized volunteers and emergent groups (Malešič, 2020, pg. 3). The second criticism is related to the ICS and NIMS structure and how it criticizes that it is not suitable for all types of organizations. It is suitable for hierarchical organizations such as police and firefighters but not for civilian organizations (Malešič, 2020, pg. 3). Critics believe the FEMA and its approaches are complex and bureaucratic. For instance, multiple documents are needed to explain the concept and functional details (Malešič, 2020, pg. 3). In addition, critics of the structure argue that because FEMA functions within the ICS world, it lacks a people-centered approach. Those who agree with those statements above would argue that to solve human problems; we must operate with a central focus on the individual and their needs. We must socially and comprehensively work together as equals to solve problems created by nature and destruction. However, others can argue against this as we observe each administration contributing to its agenda and approaches. For instance, the Biden Administration has given attention to vulnerable groups, a whole community-centered approach that forces FEMA strategic goals to integrate more with vulnerable populations. In January 2024, the Biden Administration announced “that FEMA is reforming its federal assistance policies and expanding benefits for disaster survivors to cut red tape, provide funds faster and give people more flexibility.” (Biden-Harris Administration Reforms Disaster Assistance Program to help survivors recover faster 2024) This announcement strengthens the argument that ICS and NIMS may be performance-driven. Still, as an institution, FEMA aims to strengthen its ties with communities and individuals who need them the most.

International System: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

At the international level, various actors present themselves when a disaster affects a nation or region. However, one agency’s task is to unite these individuals under one unified approach. Hence, OCHA is the UN agency that leads international humanitarian response. OCHA works with national and international actors to advocate for the rights of people in need, promote preparedness and prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions. (Rubenstein, 2018, pg. 21). OCHA plays a crucial role in operational crisis coordination, which includes needs assessment, funds, and resource mobilization, as well as developing common strategies to address issues such as negotiating access and monitoring progress (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 7). OCHA works with all actors involved in the response mechanism, including other UN agencies, governments, the military, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC), civil society actors, non-government organizations (NGOs), and the private sector (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 6).

After a country presents an international appeal, assistance from various actors begins to arrive in the zones of devastation. International aid can arrive from all over the world. It is the responsibility of OCHA to coordinate efforts. At the international level, the UN places the mandate OCHA and the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC); together, they create the appropriate response working alongside other internal and external actors. (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 6).

UNDAC is designed to help the governments of disaster-affected countries. (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 6). UNDAC teams are deployed upon the request of the affected government. UNDAC is led by the UN resident/humanitarian coordinator, who then activates the clusters, NGOs, and others. (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 6). The international response mechanism includes a variety of international organizations, including the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)(Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 6). They all operate worldwide to prevent and alleviate human suffering, protect life and health, and ensure respect for human beings, particularly during armed conflict and other humanitarian emergencies (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 7). The ICRC is the system’s patriarch, providing the bulk of its resources (Rubenstein, 2018, pg. 14). These humanitarian actors each have a specific role in the response mechanism but require a unified body to unite them for the same objectives.

How does UNDAC differ from OCHA? The answer is that UNDAC is a part of OCHA, but they have distinct roles. UNDAC focuses explicitly on rapid deployment for disaster response and assessment missions, providing immediate support to affected countries. On the other hand, OCHA has a broader mandate, coordinating international humanitarian response efforts, policy, and advocacy across various crises. UNDAC teams are typically composed of trained emergency response professionals who assess needs and help coordinate on the ground. Meanwhile, OCHA works at a higher level to ensure coordination and resource mobilization among UN agencies and humanitarian partners. Alongside both, many intergovernmental organizations, including the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), are added to the international mechanism. (Rubenstein, 2018, pg. 14). Aside from these intergovernmental organizations, global NGOs such as World Vision, CARE International, Save the Children, etc., work independently and support disaster response activities (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 8). Since the end of the Cold War, NGOs have worked hard to improve their operations, calculate their effectiveness, and be more accountable to their donors and beneficiaries (Barnett & Weiss, 2008, pg. 236). These developments enable aid agencies to help more people in need than ever before (Barnett & Weiss, 2008, pg. 236).

The literature review interprets this system as a people-centered approach to providing humanitarian assistance. A people-centered approach recognizes that a person’s gender, age, and other characteristics significantly impact how they experience emergencies and access assistance. They argue that a people-centered approach is critical to a more effective and coordinated emergency response. It focuses on the differences in cultures, priorities, and operating methods between military and civilian actors, which can significantly impact information management (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 10). The cluster approach was created to effectively coordinate international humanitarian aid actions. The intended outcome is to concentrate resources and coordinate relief through one central local point of contact (Stumpenhorst, Stumpenhorst & Razum, 2011, pg. 589). The cluster approach is composed of several groups at the global level, such as the agriculture cluster, education cluster, health cluster, nutrition cluster, protection cluster, WASH cluster, and others. Each cluster is led by a cluster lead and compromised by various NGOs united and classified by the type of programs and projects they intend to apply in the response phase (Stumpenhorst, Stumpenhorst & Razum, 2011, pg. 592).

The primary critique of this response mechanism centers on challenges in coordinating and fostering cooperation among a diverse array of responding organizations and agencies. Large-scale disasters surpass the capacity of a single organization, necessitating collaboration among actors who may not have interacted previously. Coordination hurdles include the absence of a common language, differences in contextual analysis, cultural disparities, and unfamiliarity with respective mandates, including the roles of the UN and other global and sub-national institutions (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 10). A secondary criticism highlights the lack of universal adherence to specific guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOPs) among responders and recipients of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 10). Concerns arise from the use of disparate terminology and the necessity for increased involvement of military, NGOs, and civil society groups in dialogues to enhance the quality of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018, pg. 10).

Overall, the literature review compares two separate systems, emphasizing the recurring challenges experienced in various countries regardless of political affiliations or borders. The primary objective is to address the shared problems humanitarian workers encounter in the field, whether in American territory or the Caribbean; the focus is on analyzing emergency response measures. The anticipated outcome of a side-by-side comparison of response mechanisms in disasters aims to uncover the underlying problems affecting both structures and how humanitarian responders can inspire each other to create practical solutions. Overall, a comparative method will allow us, as disaster management students, to explore patterns, processes, and policies among different response mechanisms that can assist in developing effective responses.

Methodology

The problem to be addressed is the absence of a comparative analysis between the two response systems, which poses a critical limitation in understanding their relative efficacy and impact. Without a direct comparison, the existing research fails to discern which system performs better or identifies optimal practices. This deficiency hampers evidence-based decision-making, hindering policymakers and practitioners from selecting the most effective strategies. It jeopardizes the possibility for the actors who respond to the same disasters worldwide to learn from their ongoing problems. The intended outcome of this chapter is to demonstrate that even though the terminology is different in each approach, the two systems have a response mechanism that serves different cultures but the same type of victims. The comparative study is based on primary and secondary sources. Furthermore, the comparative approach has selected one case study from the developing world and another from the United States territories. Disasters affect all nations, but it has been observed that disasters are creating common problems among developed and developing nations.

The following mixed-method research will be conducted to investigate the complex process of response after a disaster. The mixed methods approach allows for flexibility in addressing such a complex field of work. It is defined as a versatile and integrative research strategy that combines the numerical strength of quantitative data with the depth of qualitative insights. Combining both allows the readers and researcher to investigate in depth using all necessary tools. The chapter will utilize a case study approach to explore sequential and explanatory reasoning on the common problems both response models face. The qualitative data format will be used in one case study, while the other will utilize quantitative data for proper analysis. To elaborate on this approach, the data utilized for the Haiti case study will utilize annual work plans, testimonies, site assessments, and other qualitative information based on immediate responsive efforts within the cluster approach. The second case study will focus on the quantitative data provided on several national reporting platforms, allowing an in-depth analysis of the immediate response through humanitarian logistical efforts. Overall, the intended outcome is investigating and analyzing past historical cases and analyzing gaps and optional approaches.

The upcoming section will delve into the earthquake in Haiti. This case study was selected due to its extensive information and global impact. The execution of its response mechanism marked a pivotal moment in disaster management. The second case study examines Hurricane Maria, chosen for its relevance to the United States’ response mechanism and historical significance to the region.

Case Study: Haiti

The first case study to analyze will be the devastating earthquake of 2010 that destroyed Haiti. In January 2010, Haiti was struck with a 7.0 magnitude earthquake. In the immediate aftermath, the capital of Port-au-Prince and nearby areas were destroyed (Altay & Labonte, 2014). The epicenter was 25 km from the densely populated capital, Port-au-Prince (Altay & Labonte, 2014). An estimated 97,000 dwellings were destroyed, and 188,000 were damaged, resulting in 222,750 dead, 300,572 injured, and more than 1.5 million homeless. (Kirsch, Sauer & Guha Sapir, 2012). At the time of the earthquake, Haiti’s government was barely functioning; it was rated as one of the most corrupt in the world and affected by civil violence= (Kirsch, Sauer & Guha Sapir, 2012). As the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti could not provide its citizens with the basics for daily life (Kirsch, Sauer & Guha Sapir, 2012). Private institutions or NGOs provide public services such as education, sanitation, and health care, not the government (Salam & Khan, 2020). As a result, the government lacked the financial resources, management, and leadership infrastructure to respond effectively. Haiti has no standing army, fire, or pre-hos-vital services and only a tiny, unprofessional police force, representing the usual core of local disaster response (Salam & Khan, 2020). What occurred in Haiti not only redirected how the world responds to disasters but ultimately changed the field of disaster management. The case study of Haiti in 2010 allows us to investigate the approach utilized by the UN OCHA response mechanism to approach challenges created by the disaster. How did the cluster approach collect valuable and accurate information after a disaster destroys an existing government and provides resources to an impoverished population? To maintain the focus on the objectives of this chapter, the following section will focus on the problems of the coordination and flow of information that developed in Haiti.

The first question to ask is, what occured following the disaster? The answer is that OCHA immediately deployed a disaster assessment and coordination team to begin organizing (Salam & Khan, 2020). The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) logistics base at the airport became the center of operations, and OCHA established a joint operations and tasking center (JOTC) with militaries from the United States, Canada, the European Union, and the Caribbean to better coordinate with the military response. (Salam & Khan, 2020). OCHA and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee implemented the UN humanitarian cluster system to manage and coordinate the response. Many equipment, personnel, and supplies began arriving in Haiti after the disaster. Most headed by UN agencies, each of the 11 clusters covered a technical area such as water, sanitation, hygiene (WASH), nutrition, health, security, etc. (Kirsch, Sauer & Guha Sapir, 2012).

The cluster approach was introduced in Haiti in 2008 (Altay & Labonte, 2014). An evaluation completed just before the earthquake resulted in the following findings: 1) it had improved coordination but was weak on ownership and accountability; 2) it had been implemented in a top-down fashion without regard for existing national coordination structures; 3) it did not sufficiently engage with national NGOs; 4) it was held back by OCHA’s limited capacity and 5) it was the link between the cluster approach and the Humanitarian Coordinator remained unclear (Altay & Labonte, 2014). All these shortcomings further manifested after the disaster (Altay & Labonte, 2014). Therefore, the literature review findings identified that the cluster system did not function well early in the Haitian response for numerous reasons.

For instance, the findings revealed that more than 400 organizations attended the health cluster meetings, usually attended by 15 to 20 (Altay & Labonte, 2014). This data demonstrates that Haiti and the cluster system were not created to manage the high numbers of participants that appeared overnight effectively. In addition, interviews with cluster members reported disappointment with the caliber of cluster leaders. One noted that Haiti was “an opportunity to showcase what had been built in the last few years. The people they had initially were maybe very technically savvy, but they did not have the skills to run a cluster. It didn’t happen quickly regarding getting the ‘A team’ there” (Altay & Labonte, 2014). To make matters worse, cluster coordinators have had a high turnover. Only the camp coordination camp management (CCCM) cluster has had the same coordinator since February 2010 (Altay & Labonte, 2014). At the outset of the crisis, almost all cluster meetings took place at MINUSTAH’s Logistics Base (Logs Base). (Altay & Labonte, 2014). The inaccessible venue, strict security procedures, and the use of English deterred Haitian attendance. Only the government co-chaired the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) cluster. Only WASH and the education cluster exclusively used French (Altay & Labonte, 2014).

Furthermore, some cluster meetings were held in English, and local officials and NGOs could not participate, meaning those in attendance were outsiders who may or may not have had previous fieldwork experience in Haiti. Respondents noted that many international non-governmental organizations (INGO) and UN newcomers rarely consult long-established agencies with experienced staff (Altay & Labonte, 2014). One evaluation judged “the uncontrollable flow of frequently inexperienced small NGOs” as a significant factor limiting the quality of the humanitarian response (Altay & Labonte, 2014). The World Bank regrets “the arrival of many agencies new to the country tending to prioritize unilateral action over coordination” (Altay & Labonte, 2014). The findings based on the evidence indicated that a lack of experience in Haiti resulted in having the wrong people involved and not consulting the locals. Cluster leads had difficulty identifying local NGOs to invite, and those who did attend reported the meetings were often irrelevant (Altay & Labonte, 2014). Initially, the government was only peripherally involved, meaning it had a minimal role. Having a government presence encourages others to be present and prioritize attending meetings. Hence, the needed individuals were not in attendance, and those appointed to attend cluster meetings were often business people without links with relevant ministries. The government was insufficiently represented, and it took a long time to re-establish relationships caused by the turnover of individuals serving each cluster.

Findings of the data also indicated that the cluster approach failed to store and manage information. This mismanagement included a lack of accessibility, inconsistency of formatting, storage media misalignment, and the lack of sharing among actors. As a direct result, there was inconsistency in how effective humanitarian actors tried coordinating information flows between actors on the ground in a humanitarian emergency and their immediate relief efforts. These impediments affect the early response, which becomes challenging in the later phases, including the development phase (Altay & Labonte, 2014). In the case of Haiti, it was found that “the quality and reliability of data being used for decision-making were closely linked to how they were gathered and stored as well as whether and to what degree humanitarian actors could access them on the ground” (Altay & Labonte, 2014). The investigations by evaluators concluded that the delay in response was more related to the lack of accurate information than the lack of resources. An organization’s response was inadequate and delayed “despite its three-million-dollar price tag, which covered 128 staff, 23 helicopters, and 51 vehicles,” the reaction was based on outdated and unreliable sources. (Altay & Labonte, 2014).

The case study provides a significant understanding of the various problems humanitarian responders face after a disaster. Within the immediate response mechanism, the case study of Haiti demonstrated the impact of lack of information and leadership as obstacles in the operational strategies. In addition, not including the locals and inundating the response mechanism with amateur but well-intended NGOs created several layers of problems. This case study provides many findings demonstrating the pressures given to a response mechanism at the international level operating within the cluster approach. Even though the cluster approach is a response mechanism designed to provide organized international humanitarian assistance, the analysis reveals the underlying structural issues that can arise from various gaps in the response structure. The example of Haiti demonstrates that the intended structure of a response mechanism is not always the implemented structure.

Overall, this section focused on understanding how the cluster approach led by the UN OCHA addressed the strains in communication and the flow of information. This common problem can arise in any disaster, whether human-made or natural. Case studies like Haiti will always provide a plethora of information that can be utilized as lessons learned to prevent the same mistakes from occurring in Haiti and other nations. In this specific chapter, Haiti serves as a case study that can be analyzed internationally but can also occur with the United States territories.

Case Study: Puerto Rico

The following case study covers Hurricane Maria, which destroyed parts of Puerto Rico. The responding organization was FEMA, as this disaster occurred within U.S. territories, and the victims of this disaster were American citizens. Maria, which made landfall in Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017, shut down ports, destroyed crops, and disrupted the power grid, leaving supermarkets without electricity or fuel to run their generators (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, 2018). Hundreds of thousands of people were left without easy access to food (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, 2018). Puerto Rico was amid a financial crisis well before Maria hit, contributing to multiple systemic failures. Minimal investment in infrastructure resulted from a prolonged financial decline over the past decade. Roads, highways, bridges, water and sewage systems, and the electric grid were more or less left neglected. This set the stage for a hurricane to intersect with a man-made calamity. All these issues affecting Puerto Rico before the landing of Hurricane Maria made FEMA’s job even more difficult. Together, a broken electrical grid, poor conditions on roads and bridges, and even issues with telecommunications affected the FEMA response. However, the chapter will focus on the logistical limitations FEMA failed to overcome appropriately.

The case study of Puerto Rico in 2017 provides quantitative data on the logistical constraints faced by FEMA after Hurricane Maria. This section of the chapter will focus on the response mechanism of FEMA and how its inability to appropriately respond to the challenges created delayed response efforts. The intended outcome is to provide enough information to allow the reader to understand the problem and provide a platform for understanding how FEMA operates and responds to disasters. Once we present the data, the chapter will analyze how FEMA response efforts faced challenges and attempted to create solutions. By analyzing FEMA solutions and how they failed, as scholars and practitioners of disaster management, we can apply these practices to other response mechanisms and review whether their solutions are applicable or could have adopted different measures. Learning from the past, especially in disaster management, is essential for growth and evolution.

Before we explore the data provided by several government documents revealing the after-action items in which FEMA struggled, we will review data on external factors that affect the loss of life. Findings were revealed by a study by Harvard University published in the New England Journal of Medicine recently challenged the Puerto Rican government’s official estimate of 64 deaths attributed to Hurricane Maria. (Kishore et al., 2018). The study suggested that the actual number of deaths could be closer to 4,500 (Kishore et al., 2018). A separate study by George Washington University put the toll at 2,975 (Kishore et al., 2018). In a poignant response to honor the innumerable dead, individuals from across the territory were leaving empty shoes at the capitol (Kishore et al., 2018). Although the Puerto Rican government now acknowledges 2,975, if this figure stands, it will mark Hurricane Maria as the deadliest U.S. hurricane since 1900 (Kishore et al., 2018). Overall, the death toll and aftermath of the devastation are the results of debate. Some may argue that underreporting was a feature of the debate to preserve the integrity of the response efforts. However, for the focus of this chapter, our intended investigation is on the logistical failures and areas of opportunities for future response efforts.

A 2011 exercise after-action report for Puerto Rico indicated the territory would require extensive federal support in moving commodities from the mainland to the island and through distribution points. FEMA responded by including actions to address the longstanding planning issues (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). However, in the immediate response that followed Hurricane Maria, FEMA lost visibility of about 38 percent (4,462) of its commodity shipments to Puerto Rico, worth an estimated 257 million dollars (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Approximately 98 percent (4,354) of those commodity shipments comprised meals and water (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Water and food, two of the most essential life-sustaining commodities, experienced average shipping delays of 71 and 59 days, respectively (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Commodities successfully delivered to Puerto Rico took an average of 69 days to reach their final destinations (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 2020). FEMA could not ensure that it provided Puerto Rico disaster survivors with commodities to sustain life and alleviate suffering as part of its response and recovery mission (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). FEMA stated that one of the possible reasons for its challenges was that Hurricane Maria occurred at the same time as other disasters that challenged FEMA (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Hence, the multiple disasters that have occurred stretched the capacity of FEMA to respond effectively.

The findings by the external agency of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that of the approximately 97 million liters of water FEMA shipped to Puerto Rico between September 2017 and April 2018, only 36 million liters (approximately 37 percent) reached the points of distribution (POD) (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). In the same period, of the 53 million meals FEMA shipped, only 24 million (approximately 24 percent) reached RSAs or PODs for distribution (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). It took FEMA an average of ten days immediately after the hurricane to deliver the first food and water to the disaster survivors (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022).

Furthermore, only 27 percent (8 of 30) of the municipalities received sufficient water, and only 20 percent (6 of 30) received sufficient food in the first commodity delivery (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Forty percent (12 out of 30) of municipalities said they experienced significant problems receiving expired food (Kim & Bui, 2019). FEMA sent snack boxes instead because it could not send nutritionally unexpired food due to the demand from concurrent disasters (Kim & Bui, 2019). Puerto Rican officials reported one meal for approximately every twelve snack boxes distributed to a survivor. FEMA faced challenges when reconciling Puerto Rico’s meal distribution records (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Without proper food and water, survivors of the Hurricane had limited chances of survival (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). FEMA’s sole responsibility of providing relief was hindered by logistical constraints, which resulted in a human-made disaster (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022).

In addition, inadequate FEMA contractor oversight contributed to the lost visibility and delayed commodity shipments (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). FEMA did not use its Global Positioning System transponders to track commodity shipments, allowed the contractor to break inventory seals, and did not ensure documented proof of commodity deliveries (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Given the lost visibility and delayed shipments, FEMA did not ensure it provided commodities to Puerto Rico disaster survivors as needed to sustain life and alleviate suffering as part of its response and recovery mission (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). FEMA mistakes were further complicated because the Puerto Rican government lacked a formal records management system to track commodities received from FEMA and distributed to the municipalities. Manual records were used that were not filed in an organized manner (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). The combination became a logistical nightmare for tracking highly needed resources amid chaos (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022).

The evaluation’s findings revealed that the observed violations stemmed from inadequate acquisition planning, particularly the failure to address requirements for transoceanic shipments (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). It was identified that FEMA overlooked the significance of adhering to sound inventory management practices, escalating contract costs without proper documentation of performed services (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). These actions exposed a significant risk of fraud, waste, and abuse, with questioned costs amounting to approximately 50 million (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Despite GAO’s conclusions regarding commodity distribution, FEMA disputed them, asserting that its reconciliation successfully accounted for all but 19 of the 9,775 containers shipped to Puerto Rico (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). However, GAO contends that it took FEMA several months to locate these containers on the island, acknowledging that some were empty or contained different products than expected (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Ultimately, the GAO report indicates that the number of lost commodities remains undeterminable due to FEMA’s mismanagement of the distribution process (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022).

Discussion and Implications

The professional obligation of any practitioner is the responsibility of action to help the most vulnerable. By performing a comparative analysis of the response to disasters in Haiti and Puerto Rico, we have learned that both systems were designed to serve the populations they intended to protect and serve while responding to their needs after the disaster. The chapter reveals two separate systems working independently from each other, both affected by the problems created by the severity of disasters. One of the case studies was an in-depth investigation into the problem of failing to create effective communication channels after a disaster, including having the wrong leaders communicate the needs or conduct proper assessments. The other focused on investigating logistical impediments in providing response resources to disaster victims. The chapter utilized two cases, and the outcome was two separate areas of opportunity. The firstreveals the importance of coordination and proper flow of communication through the cluster formation The second reiterates the importance of effective humanitarian logistics. The two response mechanisms struggled to create effective solutions to provide relief. The following section will focus on expanding the discussion, diving into the independent problems, and addressing possible solutions.

What did we learn from comparing these two disasters? The gain is substantial. By comparing the response mechanisms of FEMA and OCHA, we can investigate what works and what doesn’t. This comparison allows policymakers, disaster response agencies, and humanitarian organizations to learn from past experiences, adapt strategies, and implement practices that improve the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster response. By learning from successes and failures, we can develop more resilient systems that better protect and support affected communities, no matter where a disaster strikes. We can also ask ourselves, why not compare two domestic responses or two international disasters? The answer is complex, but as globalization continues to link the world, so does the response mechanism to disasters. Comparing international and domestic responses highlights the need to build resiliency and preparedness at all levels. Furthermore, humanitarian actors, whether professionals or volunteers, respond to disasters with the same passion to save lives and reduce suffering.

As mentioned by David McEntire, disasters do not stop at borders and they are not immune from politics (McEntire, 1997). As globalization and world alliances grow and interconnect, the existing literature on the topic must be conducted through an international lens (McEntire, 1997). Disasters are therefore global issues that require scholars and practitioners to find standard solutions to the common problems faced by all nations and system structures of disaster management. (McEntire, 1997). Comparing an international disaster response mechanism like OCHA with a domestically orientated organization like FEMA provides valuable information that can lead to a more resilient system. The following section will focus on finding realistic and reliable solutions to standard practices and policies.

OCHA Response

The Haiti Earthquake revealed several areas of opportunity. The earthquake revealed the importance of improving coordination, focusing on the survivors, and avoiding individual agendas. The flaws in the quality of the information were driven by having the wrong actors in each meeting. Individuals who represented agencies who did not know the local environment or had local connections. They developed solutions to a situation that they had no prior knowledge of. In addition, the individuals who assisted in the immediate aftermath were not adequately prepared to function with the OCHA system of clusters.

Furthermore, the quality of communication would have been improved if local leaders would have been involved in the conversation. Instead, you had outsiders designing the solutions for a country without minimal understanding, especially regarding cultural dynamics and dialect. Therefore, the quality of information and communication is linked to the quality of leaders creating the solutions. It is also linked to the reduction of personnel turnover. We must have the right leaders and maintain them in position as long as the response efforts need proper coordination.

The outcomes of the Haiti Earthquake reminded us that we must redesign strategies so that the system exists to serve. The case study demonstrates the need to focus on the needs of the victims and populations affected by the disaster and less on the donors or the overall bureaucracy of the process, which correlates to the original importance of the definition and essence of humanitarianism. No matter the agency you serve or your title as a first responder or humanitarian actor, we all aim to save lives and reduce suffering. Hence, if we all have a common goal, we should all understand that solutions to communication and logistics are essential to continue with the overall goal of response. In addition, Haiti reminds the responding agencies and countries that humanitarian responders need to be educated and trained responders who understand the complexities of the UN-OCHA coordination system and its minimum standards. This would be a viable solution to the problem of having individuals involved in such a massive effort understand the inner workings of the cluster approach. The solutions to several of the problems of the cluster system focus on having the correct leaders in place. Regarding coordination, we observe a direct link between the quality of information and those who are collecting and transferring the information. The effects seen in Haiti could have been avoided if the proper handling and collection of information had been accurate and concise, avoiding duplication or waste of resources. Overall, the findings suggest that improvements in communication will improve coordination among actors, thus improving decision-making and response frameworks.

Concerning cluster formation, optimal recovery efforts were achieved when the right individuals were consistently present in meetings and minimized turnovers. Practical solutions such as conducting cluster meetings in accessible locations, addressing language barriers through the cautious use of English, fostering increased engagement from both government and civil society, and reducing coordinator turnovers underscore the imperative to enhance the effectiveness of the cluster system. Implementing these changes collectively would have significantly bolstered response efforts in Haiti. However, communication issues, leading to mistrust, posed a significant challenge, particularly weakening effectiveness in subsequent phases.

The next section, analyzing the FEMA response will allow the reader to ponder on the types of changes needed by response mechanisms and whether domestic agencies like FEMA or international actors like OCHA should be required to acknowledge the flaws and launch changes as the need and demand continue to rise. The next section will also provide dialogue that supports the need for conversations with local governments and affected populations. We limit our scope of solutions and potential risks by leaving the conversation at the agency or donor level. Overall, the case studies of Haiti and Puerto Rico provide qualitative and quantitative data illustrating the consequences suffered by both response mechanisms. The reports and data prove that response mechanisms are not simply political and bureaucratic processes but have actual tangible costs. As practitioners and scholars, we cannot water down the data as it represents lives lost and saved by the decisions of a few.

FEMA Response

The reporting by the GAO revealed several areas of improvement in FEMA’s response (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). Hurricane Maria devasted U.S. territory and disrupted the lives of American citizens. However, for several logistical reasons, FEMA could not assist disaster survivors. That is one of the FEMA’s critical responsibilities (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). This section is dedicated to discussing possible solutions to the problems faced by FEMA. The operating standard should be FEMA’s ability to have real-time visibility of all commodity orders, order status, such as pending or filled, and the progressive movement of commodities from the initial location to the final destination. FEMA personnel at the Jacksonville location reported that some commodity shipments intended for Puerto Rico likely never left the continental United States (United States Government Accountability Office, 2022). The solution is already presented in the recommendations of the GAO for FEMA to use the Logistics Supply Chain Management System (LSCMS) to track commodities and property shipments from initial order to final distribution. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 2020). The recommendation is for FEMA to complete a comprehensive strategy for improving asset tracking and in-transit visibility across all modes of transportation. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 2020).

Labeling the impact of Hurricane Maria as an isolated incident, tempting as it may be, overlooks the convergence of politics, economics, and natural forces. Instead, the disaster should be viewed as a poignant cautionary tale, highlighting the need for proactive measures beyond post-event assessments. In a highly active hurricane-prone region, Puerto Rico underscores the necessity for substantial changes in facing the ongoing challenges. The narrative of its reconstruction emphasizes that our current way of life, spanning legal and financial systems, remains ill-prepared for the forthcoming changes. Furthermore, Hurricane Maria reveals the value of logistics. Logistics after a disaster is essential for saving lives. It is a necessary skill in the response efforts of all disasters. Specifically, humanitarian logistics is essential in providing food, water, shelter, and necessary items to give victims dignity. However, if the response coordination and actors involved are not aware of the needed logistical elements, time and resources lost will result in deaths and unnecessary suffering by the victims.

Hurricane Maria shed light on the limitations of a response mechanism like FEMA, exposing its inability to manage multiple disasters simultaneously—particularly those affecting islands a thousand miles from the mainland. The events of 2017 highlighted the imperative for response mechanisms to be prepared to address multiple disasters concurrently (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, 2018). As time progresses, the frequency and intensity of disasters rise, making simultaneous occurrences a recurring aspect of the foreseeable future. Hurricane Maria also teaches us that the nation needs to stop responding to disasters by throwing massive amounts of money and effort at them after the fact. And the nation needs FEMA to support better communities’ efforts to avoid becoming the next disaster (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, 2018). These efforts expand FEMA’s response role to help communities prepare and mitigate risks, ensuring they are better equipped to handle emergencies and reduce vulnerability. In addition to training, these efforts should investigate what solutions are needed and what training gaps are found within each community. It must act beyond its interest and improve and effectively change the system for the families and individuals it was created to serve.

Future Implications to the Field of Disaster Management

Effective disaster response requires seamless coordination and communication. The OCHA response to the Haiti earthquake demonstrated the complexities of communicating among numerous agencies and organizations, each with its protocols and channels. Meanwhile, the FEMA response in Puerto Rico highlighted how bureaucratic inefficiencies and poor coordination can hinder relief efforts within the jurisdiction of one single actor. Analyzing these aspects helps develop better frameworks for coordination, whether domestic or international. In the aftermath of a disaster, the coordination and flow of information are profoundly affected. The damage to critical infrastructure, including communication networks, poses a significant challenge to transmitting essential information. Power outages and failures in telecommunication systems disrupt traditional communication channels, impeding emergency responders and communities from sharing crucial updates that can impact human safety. The overwhelming scale of the disaster strains emergency services, leading to delays and inefficiencies in disseminating life-saving information (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018). Inconsistencies in information from various stakeholders can create confusion and hinder practical decision-making efforts to protect human lives (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018). Limited access to technology in some areas further exacerbates the difficulty for individuals in receiving timely and accurate information about the disaster and available assistance. Overcoming these challenges involves prioritizing resilient communication infrastructure, implementing effective emergency response plans, and leveraging technology to enhance communication to preserve human lives in such crises.

A common problem that affects all disasters is maintaining the quality of information at the highest standard, given the limited resources. When reporting is accurate and consistent, the response mechanism is executed effectively. If the information within the reporting is flawed, it will cause low confidence in those who execute the response efforts. As stated by Cook, Shrestha & Htet (2018), “the lack of comprehensive, cross-functional, accurate and current information…” creates an atmosphere of chaos resulting in duplication of efforts, overlooking specific sectors, including vulnerable populations, and the overall inability to make accurate response choices. . In reviewing the implications of the value of information in creating effective response efforts, I can reflect on my own experience. In 2011, as a program director for an international NGO, I faced constant issues reporting accurate site assessments to our headquarters. With limited cell phone coverage and transportation limitations to the worst affected areas, the information collected changed by the minute. Providing constant and accurate information to our headquarters and documentation on the location of victims helped our staff create logistical solutions to providing humanitarian relief within hours. As a humanitarian actor, I was the only source of reliable information in a country devasted by chaos and rumble. Along with others in the disasters, I was the eyes and ears for each perspective NGO, responsible for transferring information to headquarters within minutes of landing. Hence, my fieldwork experience provides a foundational qualitative approach to reviewing the literature and the case studies.

The synergy between humanitarian logistics and communication is crucial for orchestrating a timely and impactful relief effort, ultimately saving lives and addressing the urgent needs of disaster-stricken communities (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018). Humanitarian logistics is pivotal after a disaster, as it facilitates the organized and swift delivery of life-saving aid and resources to affected areas (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018). Effective communication is an integral component of this process, ensuring that relevant information about the needs on the ground is efficiently conveyed to logistics teams, allowing for a targeted and responsive distribution of essential supplies, medical assistance, and shelter (Cook, Shrestha & Htet, 2018).

Humanitarian logistics include procurement, warehousing, transportation, and coordinating goods, information, and finances. Donors are the source of finances and supplies, with disaster victims as the ultimate recipients. The unpredictability of goods’ demand within the humanitarian logistics system places constraints on supply chain organizations, often requiring swift responses to meet the urgent needs of those affected. Furthermore, in their perspective and response approaches, the two case studies provided valuable evidence on realistic impediments to developing appropriate response mechanisms in providing immediate relief and collecting quality information.

Conclusion

As disasters rise in frequency and strength, learning how to investigate how we study disasters in a comparative method outside of domestic borders is an effective way to face the future. In addition, as the world depends on global partnerships to respond to and aid the victims, there is a greater need to focus on the similarities rather than differences of responsive systems. Comparing the responses in Puerto Rico and Haiti can lead to developing more robust and adaptable disaster management strategies by identifying best practices and common pitfalls in international and domestic responses. Any investigation hopes to result in policy reforms and improve coordination frameworks, ensuring a more efficient allocation of resources and quicker, more effective relief efforts in future disasters. Additionally, it can enhance the resilience of communities by integrating lessons learned into preparedness programs, ultimately reducing the vulnerability of populations to similar catastrophes. The expectation is for chapters like these to lead to more resilient and well-prepared societies.

In this chapter, we have evaluated two separate systems that are currently functioning around the world. Two systems with the central vision and mission of saving lives and providing immediate relief after a disaster. In addition, the case studies, from their perspectives, logistics and coordination, revealed that both responses, whether OCHA’s approach or FEMA’s, face significant challenges. The chapter revealed that these challenges are crucial and significant as we prepare for future disasters. Both systems, created to improve the response mechanism, have proven weak within these case studies. However, rather than interpreting the data as condemning, we hope the findings bring the actors involved in both systems (FEMA and OCHA) together and discuss possible solutions adaptable to both response systems. The overall outcome of this analysis is the need for a unified method of examining response mechanisms. However, due to this chapter’s capacity limitations, we cannot review all the problems affecting these two specific structures of response mechanisms. Nor could we review human-made disasters that can alter the comparison and response approaches. Future research should approach a similar analysis of different types of disasters. They also focus on how the problems require humanitarian responders to adopt different approaches.

One famous story about how we face disaster is the story of David and Goliath. David, a shepherd, faced the giant Goliath with just a sling and stones. (Bible, N. I. V. (1973). Despite his size disadvantage, David’s precision and faith prevailed, defeating Goliath. This triumph symbolizes courage, resourcefulness, and the ability to overcome challenges, showcasing that even the seemingly powerless can conquer formidable adversaries. In disaster management, the goliaths of our field are not simply the disasters we face but also the giants created by reoccurring problems faced in all disasters. These recurring problems consistently challenge communities and responders; examples are inadequate preparedness, resource allocations, and even social inequities. The case studies revealed that the goliaths we create within our response systems can be overcome and resolved with proper planning and mitigation efforts. Whether the response is in the United States or outside its territories, FEMA and the responding agents must acknowledge that changes are needed. The same applies to the United Nations OCHA agencies’ operating principles and coordination efforts. Nonetheless, both would benefit from learning from each other and applying these changes universally, as disasters have no borders.

Overcoming the bottlenecks of disaster response is acknowledging that one approach is not a fit-all, but learning from history is imperative to improve. As David McEntire mentions, “International success will ultimately be achieved through the individual and collective efforts of academics and practitioners in this decade and the decades to come” (McEntire, 1997). The solution for the results of these case studies lies in creating a path to move forward. A path that brings these two voices together while respecting what each contributes. We all come from different avenues. Different national structures, different emergency management systems of countries, different types of hazards, and different international organizations. The difference should not be the central focus; the similarities should be in both challenges. As evident in the results of this chapter, improvement is needed. We are facing similar challenges, including the response and rescue of victims after a disaster.

The intended outcome of this chapter is for an adequate comparison to drive conversations between actors that can be driven into actions applied to both within the near future. The rise in frequency and intensity of disasters worldwide necessitates urgent improvements in emergency preparedness and response systems. As these catastrophic events become more common, we need capable response systems to cope with the increased scale and complexity of the impacts. There is a critical need for enhanced international collaboration and innovation in disaster management to mitigate risks and protect vulnerable communities effectively. Strengthening resilience through research while utilizing technology and community involvement is essential to adapting to this new reality and reducing the devastating consequences of such events.

 

 

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